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THE USE OF SECTION 214 OF THE




The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), pursuant to title II of
the Communications Act of 1934 (Act),' is charged with regulating all in-
terstate telecommunications 2 in order to ensure wide accessibility to effi-
cient, reasonably priced communication services.' Because of both the
need for one integrated telephone system and the great expense of poles,
lines, and easements, the communications industry became highly concen-
trated in its early years.4 Recent developments in low-cost transmission
technology, however, have made competitive telecommunications markets
more feasible.5 To protect competition, the FCC has sought to restrict
common carriers6 with de jure or defacto monopolies from engaging in
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1-744 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2. Telecommunications is the transmission of information, audio, video, or data on
radio waves or electrical cable. Note, Recent Federal Actions Affecting Long Distance Tele-
communications.- A Survey of Issues Concerning the Microwave Specialized Common Carrier
Industry, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 878, 879-80 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Recent Federal
Actions]. A concise history of telecommunications in America is contained in FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, REPORT ON DOMESTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES § C,
at 1-21 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FCC REPORT]. See also Cossen, Development of Regula-
tion of Common Carrier Communications, 28 FED. COM. B.J. 132 (1975); Cox, The Federal
Communications Commission, 11 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 595, 670-86 (1970); Customer
Interconnection, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 778-85 (1976); K. BORCHARDT, STRUCTURE AND PER-
FORMANCE OF THE U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 23-56 (1970).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
4. FCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14. Additionally, Western Union and American
Telephone and Telegraph Company fostered monopoly; the former by aggressive business
tactics, id. at 3, and the latter by acquiring telephone companies, id at 7-11, among other
strategies. Until the late 1940's American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Western
Union Corporation, Postal Telegraph-Cable Company, independent local telephone compa-
nies, and a few other carriers were the only participants in domestic telecommunications,
each being relatively insulated from the others by either service diversity or geographic serv-
ice area. Id
5. Prior to 1969, the FCC did not encourage open entry into telecommunications pri-
marily because the prevailing technology was too primitive to make competition realistic.
See Recent FederalActions, supra note 2, at 881-83. See also Comment, Intercity Telecom-
munications Competition After Execunet, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 117, 119-22 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Competition After Execunet].
6. The concept of common carrier is borrowed from transportation regulation. Coin-
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interservice cross-subsidization.7 Absent procompetitive regulation, the
financial strength and enormous size of some carriers would allow them to
underprice competitive market services by inflating their rates for monop-
oly services.' Although communications firms can use interservice cross-
subsidies unobjectionably to finance development and marketing of new
products, the FCC has sought to eliminate this practice in all but special
circumstances. 9 Despite this FCC policy, efforts to combat cross-subsidi-
munications common carriers are business entities that transmit messages for paying sub-
scribers by wire or radio. As "carriers," they are not concerned with the content of the
messages they transmit. Telephone and telegraph companies are examples of common car-
riers. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). Common carriers have also developed means of
transmitting data between computers and their terminals, and a few carriers, such as Telenet
and Graphnet, have developed augmented data communication systems capable of sending
many data elements simultaneously between computers using different data processing
speeds. See, e.g., Customer Interconnection, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 800-03 (1976); Telenet Com.
Corp., 46 F.C.C.2d 680 (1974); Graphnet Sys., Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 800 (1974); Packet Com.,
Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 922 (1973). For a discussion on the range of services available from com-
mon carriers, see W. Lucas, Telecommunications Technologies and Services, in COMMUNICA-
TIONS FOR TOMORROW, POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980s 245 (G. Robinson ed. 1978).
7. FCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 96-99. Firms that participate in two or more product
markets may enjoy the special advantage of being able to defray the costs of one product
through pricing other products well above a reasonable rate of return. In short, they may
cross-subsidize one product with the proceeds gained from sales of other products. So long
as a firm only sells products in competitive markets, it will only be able to raise the price of a
product to subsidize another in the short-run because the overpriced product will lose sales
to the extent that it is overpriced. Firms that participate in both a regulated monopoly
market and a competitive market are in a much different situation. They may attribute
some of the production costs of their competitive products to their monopoly services and
seek higher rates from their regulators to cover the malattributed costs. See J. MEYER, W.
WILSON, M. BOUGHCUM, E. BURTON & L. CAOUETTE, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION
IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 4-18 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Economics of
Competition].
8. FCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 96-99. Interservice cross-subsidization has been a
consistent problem in private line services. See AT&T and Western Union Private Line
Cases, 34 F.C.C. 244(1961). Seealso FCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 145-48. Traditionally,
private lines were defined as transmission lines between two or more geographic points with
capabilities and features not available from the public telephone system. Since the lines are
fixed, the subscriber need not wait for the telephone company to establish a connection. Id
at 99-101; Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 541 F.2d 346, 356 n.l (3d Cir. 1976). With the
recent introduction of many so-called private line systems using "switching" devices that
transfer the lines to others' use when the private line subscriber is not using the line, the
distinctions between private line systems and basic telephone service are fading. See Com-
petition After Execunet, supra note 5, at 121 n. 16. See generally W. Baer, Telecommunica-
tions Technology in the 1980s, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW, POLICY PERSPECTIVES
FOR THE 1980s 61 (G. Robinson ed. 1978).
9. See, e.g., AT&T, 61 F.C.C.2d 587, 608 (1976) (§ 396(h) of the Act permits carriers
to provide private lines to educational television stations at noncompensatory rates). The
Commission, furthermore, has waived its policy against cross-subsidization when convinced
that noncompensatory rates are justified by competitive necessity. Id
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zation have been only moderately successful.' 0
Among the tools available to control and prevent anticompetitive carrier
practices is section 214 of the Communications Act. This provision re-
quires carriers to obtain Commission authorization before they extend,
add, acquire, or delete any transmission line."1 The FCC has broad power
to determine whether a carrier's proposed change in lines meets section
214's public convenience and necessity standard. 2 Section 214 also pro-
vides that the FCC may condition approval of transmission line changes so
that new lines may be used only for services specified by the Commis-
sion.' 3 By denying new line authorizations, or by conditioning their ap-
10. See Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 205-11 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Initial Decision
in Phase I of Docket No. 20814, FCC 79D-8, 34 (released March 19, 1979). The FCC has
used the rate investigation to eliminate cross-subsidization, but this usually protracted pro-
ceeding has not proven an effective deterrent. Id 5-32. See, e.g., AT&T (DDS), 67
F.C.C.2d 1195 (1978); AT&T (Series 7000), 67 F.C.C.2d 1134 (1978); AT&T (WATS), 66
F.C.C.2d 9 (1977). See also FCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 101-04. The FCC has also
employed structural methods to help prevent interservice cross-subsidies. See, e.g., Tariffs-
Evidence, 25 F.C.C.2d 957 (1970) (a system for substantiating costs represented by rate revi-
sions); Uniform Sys. of Accounts for Tel. Cos., 70 F.C.C.2d 719 (1978) (unfinished proceed-
ing to revise the antiquated system for conducting accounting studies). The FCC's inability
to solve the interservice cross-subsidization problem has stirred congressional reaction in the
form of bills to amend the Communications Act of 1934. See, e.g., S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979); S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976) states, in pertainent part:
(a) No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of an extension of
any line, or shall acquire or operate any line . . . or shall engage in transmission
over . . . such additional or extended line, unless and until there shall first have
been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public
convenience and necessity require. . . the construction, or operation, or construc-
tion and operation, of such additional or extended line.
(c) The Commission shall have power to issue such certificate as applied for, or to
refuse to issue it, or to issue it for a portion or portions of a line, or extension
thereof, or discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of service, described in the
application, or for the partial exercise only of such right or privilege, and may
attach to the issuance of the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment
the public convenience and necessity may require.
12. See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 858 (5th Cir.
1971) (§ 214 should be construed so as to achieve the broad aims of the Act); Western Union
Div. v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 324, 335 (D.D.C. 1949) (public convenience and necessity
standard of § 214 is to be broadly construed); 78 CONG. REC. 8824 (1934) (statement of
Congressman Dill in debate on the Communications Act of 1934 prior to its enactment),
reprinted in 4 B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY
2449 (1973) (§ 214 contains provisions that allow the FCC to be liberal in its application).
13. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 541 F.2d 346, 355 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1092 (1977). See also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 377
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
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proval, the FCC can exclude carriers from markets in which they might be
able to engage in anticompetitive practices.' 4
In its efforts to foster workable competition in telecommunications, the
FCC can also invoke section 7 of the Clayton Act 15 against anticompeti-
tive common carrier mergers. Section 7 condemns corporate mergers that
have a "reasonable probability" of substantially lessening competition or
that have a tendency to create a monopoly in any product submarket
within a geographic market.' 6 Although section 7 is so far reaching that it
has been successfully employed to defeat mergers arguably lacking the an-
ticompetitive consequences Congress sought to prevent, 7 the FCC has
rarely used it to further its regulatory efforts.' 8 In part, the Commission
has been reluctant to use section 7 because it has had other comprehensive
tools available, including the rate regulation provisions in Title II of the
Act.' 9 Furthermore, since the FCC does not possess premerger review
power,20 the Commission can only invoke its section 7 jurisdiction after a
14. See, e.g., ITT Domestic Transmissions Sys., Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 236 (1976) (FCC
approved § 214 application of an international carrier to establish a data communication
carrier subject to conditions imposing arms-length separation between the new data carrier
and the international carrier's preexisting data carrier).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section II of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976), grants
the FCC the authority to enforce § 7 of the Clayton Act. Although the FCC may invoke § 7,
it does not possess the premerger review power granted the Justice Department in 15 U.S.C.
§ 25 (1976) and the Federal Trade Commission in 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976). The Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 7a, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976), fortified these
powers. See notes 20 & 106 and accompanying text infra.
16. This judicial construction of § 7 is the prevailing test. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 584 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586, 597 (1957).
17. See Joffe, BeyondAntitrust, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 19 (1978). See also Handler,
Recent Antitrust Developments 1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 823, 837-44 (1965); United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281-89 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 580, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 20, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1814. See also International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elecs.
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1181 (D. Hawaii 1972), rev'd in part, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
19. See GTE-Telenet Merger, 72 F.C.C.2d 91, 108-10 (1979); D. MARTIN, MERGERS
AND THE CLAYTON ACT 219 (1959). See also Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 104
(1957) (title II is a comprehensive plan for the regulation of interstate telecommunications);
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 57 F. Supp. 451, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (title II of
the Act contemplates regulation of telecommunications from transmission to reception
points), afrd mem sub nom. Hotel Astor, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 837 (1945) (per
curiam).
20. See note 15 supra. Section 11 of the Clayton Act outlines the procedures for Clay-
ton Act enforcement by agencies allowed to enforce it and their powers to enforce. 15
U.S.C. § 21(b) (1976). These agencies may only enforce the Clayton Act against past and
present violations. Id See also note 106 and accompanying text infra.
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challenged merger is consummated.2' Because effective enforcement of
the Clayton Act is often practically impossible once a merger is com-
plete,22 the FCC's lack of premerger Clayton Act power has added to the
Commission's reluctance to use the Clayton Act.
Recently, in GTE-Telenet Merger,23 the FCC interpreted section 214 ex-
pansively to gain unprecedented control over a proposed carrier merger
not involving any extension, acquisition, construction, addition, or dele-
tion of transmission lines. The FCC's broad construction of section 214
allowed the agency to condition the merger of a carrier and a holding com-
pany to prevent the merged carriers from using cross-subsidization or
other anticompetitive practices. 24 Moreover, the FCC used the section 214
proceeding to conduct a preliminary Clayton Act analysis of the merger.
This innovative use of section 214 afforded the FCC premerger review
power comparable to that possessed by only the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Unlike the DOJ and
FTC powers, however, the FCC's section 214 review was unencumbered
by time constraints and was conducted under the section's broad public
convenience and necessity standard. This note will examine the signifi-
cance of the FCC's use of section 214 in GTE-Telenet Merger in light of
the emerging telecommunications industry of the 1980's.
I. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 214 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1934
A. The Federal Communication Commission's Broad Regulatory
Charter Over Entry
Congress intended section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934 to
grant the FCC power to prevent unnecessary duplications of transmission
facilities that invariably result in higher rates without corresponding bene-
fits to service subscribers. 25 This section also prevents carriers from delet-
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1976); GTE-Telenet Merger, 72 F.C.C.2d 91, 108-10 (1979).
See also United States v. FCC, 44 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 59, 72-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978), va-
cated, No. 77-1249, slip op. (D.C. Cir. March 7, 1980) (en banc).
22. GTE-Telenet Merger, 72 F.C.C.2d 91, 109 (1979); accord, H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2640-4 1. See also
FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
23. 70 F.C.C.2d 2249, reconsideration denied, 72 F.C.C.2d 91 (1979), appeal docketed
sub nom. General Tel. & Elecs. Telenet Corp. v. FCC, No. 79-1468 (D.C. Cir., May 7, 1979)
(the FCC denominated the original letter order as General Telephone and Electronics).
24. The FCC applied § 214 to the merger in a separate adjudication denominated GTE-
Telenet Merger. 72 F.C.C.2d 111, mod/ed, 72 F.C.C.2d 516, reconsideration denied, FCC
79-380 (released Dec. 4, 1979).
25. 78 CONG. REC. 10314 (1934). See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf Colo. & Santa Fe
1980]
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ing transmission lines without prior Commission approval.26 While
section 214's primary purpose is to give the FCC control over extensions
and deletions of transmission lines, the Commission has used its section
214 review process in circumstances arguably different and broader than
supervising these extensions and deletions. For example, in Nebraska Con-
tinental Telephone Co. ,27 the Commission required a telephone company
seeking to acquire and operate the transmission facilities of its parent tele-
phone company to file a section 214 application stating how the extension
of facilities would serve the public convenience and necessity. The tele-
phone companies seeking the transfer of control over the transmission
lines were essentially one economic unit, notwithstanding their separate
corporate identities. Moreover, that transfer was not designed to affect the
quality or area of service but was merely intended to implement a change
in the transferee's capital structure.28
In another case, Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company,29 the FCC de-
termined that the petitioner would have to secure Commission approval
under section 214 to lease an existing authorized transmission circuit be-
tween Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, Maryland that was owned by the
Postal Telegraph-Cable Company. Although the leased line was preexis-
tent and not a physical extension of lines, the FCC held that by leasing the
line Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company had extended its lines within
the meaning of section 214.30
Although the Commission has expansively interpreted section 214 in a
number of instances, the FCC and federal courts have on other occasions
found the section inapplicable. In Mackey Radio and Telegraph Com-
pany,31 although requiring section 214 approval for one carrier's use of
another's lines, the Commission stated, in dictum, that the section could
not be invoked to control a carrier's attempt to rearrange its circuits if the
carrier did not thereby change its authorized service area or markets. 32
Ry., 270 U.S. 266, 277 (1926); Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 541 F.2d 346, 355 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977).
26. Section 214's concern with service adequacy arose out of a 1943 amendment to the
section. See 89 CONG. REC. 777 (1943).
27. 5 F.C.C. 132 (1938).
28. Id at 133. Since the lines were only transferred and not reduced or increased, the
purposes of section 214 enunciated in its legislative history do not appear to have been
served here. The result of the line transfer, an altered capital structure, also seems to lack
any public interest consequences properly cognizable under section 214. See notes 25-26
and accompanying text supra.
29. 6 F.C.C. 562 (1938).
30. Id at 577.
31. See note 29 supra.
32. 6 F.C.C. at 573.
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Furthermore, in a 1939 report to Congress on the domestic telephone in-
dustry,33 the Commission, believing section 214 to be inapplicable to trans-
fers of corporate control over carriers, requested that Congress amend the
Act to grant the FCC power to control such transactions. 34 Again limiting
the requirement for section 214 review, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in United Telegraph Workers, AFL-
CIO v. FCC,35 rejected a challenge to Western Union's proposed Mail-
gram service, an experimental project in which certain Western Union cus-
tomers with teleprinters would be able to transmit messages to post offices
for delivery as first class mail. To provide this service, Western Union
needed only to equip post offices with reception devices. In reviewing the
FCC's order, the Court of Appeals held that a more substantial change in
existing services would be needed to require section 214 review.
36
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC3 7 is the most recent federal court
decision construing the limits of section 214. In MCI, the FCC, in a sec-
tion 214 review, refused a carrier's request for permission to offer a new
form of long distance telephone service over its authorized lines. On ap-
peal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit ruled that section 214(a) merely addresses unnecessary transmission
facility duplication and does not empower the FCC to regulate those serv-
ices a carrier might choose to offer along authorized transmission lines.38
The court acknowledged that section 214(c) permits the FCC to impose
line use restrictions, but only if the FCC determines that they are required
by the public convenience and necessity.39 The MCI court interpreted the
FCC's section 214 prior approval power narrowly, taking account of the
congressionally intended scheme for service tariffo revisions and filings
33. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE IN-
DUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
34. Id. at 601. Indicative of the FCC's continuing belief that § 214 does not apply to
transfers of corporate control over carriers is its 1967 ruling that authority under § 214 is not
required for one telephone company to acquire another. See General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 8
F.C.C.2d 183, 189, 192 (1967).
35. 436 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 924. The court characterized Mailgram as a "limited and temporary combi-
nation of existing facilities [that] does not rise to the magnitude of a new line or channel of
communication requiring certification." Id. at 925 (footnote omitted). The court declined
to decide whether Mailgram falls entirely outside § 214. Id at n.10.
37. 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1977).
38. 561 F.2d at 375.
39. Id at 377.
40. Tariffs are schedules of charges, uses, practices, and regulations that govern a serv-
ice. They are created by the carrier offering the service and represent the only conditions
under which the service is available. See Ambassador, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317,
323 (1945).
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embodied in sections 203 through 205 of the Act.4 Specifically, the court
noted that frequent use of section 214 to restrict a carrier's range of permis-
sible service offerings would affect the balance between carriers' duty to
charge reasonable rates and their right to control their own economic
destinies.42
Although section 214 has been interpreted expansively, its history shows
that it applies only to carriers' behavior involving extension or deletion of
transmission lines. The FCC's decision in GTE-Telenet Merger, while ac-
cepting this premise, broadens the reach of section 214 to include defacto
line extensions.
B. GTE's Acquisition of Telenet - The FCC's Application of Section
214 to Carrier Mergers
In December, 1978, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation
(GTE) notified the FCC of its proposed purchase of Telenet Corporation
(Telenet),43 asserting that the proposed stock purchase was not subject to
prior FCC approval. 44 In response, the FCC informed both firms that
they were required to file an application pursuant to section 214, pleading
why the acquisition would be in the public interest. 45 Although Telenet
would continue to operate its own facilities as a subsidiary of GTE,46 the
Commission regarded the corporate acquisition as a defacto acquisition of
Telenet's transmission facilities requiring section 214 authorization.47
Telenet and GTE filed a section 214 application under protest and sought
41. 561 F.2d at 374-75; 47 U.S.C. §§ 203, 204, 205 (1976). Section 203 provides that all
services must be represented by comprehensive tariffs describing all relevant aspects of the
service, while § 204 sets forth the procedures to be followed in adjudicating the lawfulness of
tariffs. Section 205 grants the FCC authority to prescribe rates and practices for carrier
services.
42. 561 F.2d at 374-75 (quoting American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 487 F.2d 865, 880 (2d
Cir. 1973)).
43. GTE-Telenet Merger, 72 F.C.C.2d 111, 113 (1979).
44. Id GTE intended to purchase all the outstanding shares of Telenet stock and to
incorporate Telenet into the GTE corporate family as a wholly-owned subsidiary. The ac-
quisition was consummated on June 13, 1979.
45. 70 F.C.C.2d at 2251.
46. Telenet is a resale carrier (one that rents its basic transmission lines from other
carriers and equips them for sub-leasing). 72 F.C.C.2d at 153. Its major submarket is aug-
mented data transmission service (data communication service capable of enhancing the
quality of transmission by such technologies as "packet switching" which allows one to send
many data bits simultaneously and inexpensively). Id at 119.
47. 70 F.C.C.2d at 2250-51. The FCC regarded the establishment of Telenet as a sub-
sidiary of GTE to be a mere formality, although Telenet would still own and operate its own
transmission lines. In the Commission's view, once Telenet became a part of GTE, irrespec-
tive of how it was related to its parent, GTE was the real owner and operator of Telenet's
lines. Id
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reconsideration of the FCC's decision that authorization was required.48
The Commission denied reconsideration in an opinion substantially reiter-
ating its original reasons for requiring review of the acquisition.4 9 Three
Commissioners dissented from the FCC's finding that the proposed corpo-
rate acquisition was cognizable under section 214. The dissenters reasoned
that since Telenet had received section 214 authorizations for its lines and
had anticipated no change in its services, the proposed merger lacked any
consequences that section 214 was designed to address.5"
In a subsequent adjudicatory proceeding,5' the FCC considered the
merits of GTE and Telenet's application for section 214 authorization of
the merger.52 After reviewing comments received from interested parties,
and without an oral hearing on the issues,53 the FCC approved the
purchase of Telenet's stock subject to ten conditions designed to ensure
that Telenet would continue to compete fully and fairly as a member of the
GTE corporate family.54 These conditions were intended to impose an
48. The Commission was faced with the classic ingredients for interservice cross-subsi-
dization. GTE is a holding company that owns numerous telephone companies enjoying
monopoly markets and other wholly-owned subsidiaries that provide ancillary communica-
tion services. Telenet, on the other hand, is a small carrier that operates in a competitive
market. Once merged, the sharing of such expenses as equipment costs, advertising ex-
penses, general overhead, and administrative costs could make service cost attribution im-
possible. See 72 F.C.C.2d at 133-37; Uniform Sys. of Accounts for Tel. Cos., 70 F.C.C.2d
719, 721-24 (1978). See also notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
49. 72 F.C.C.2d 91 (1979). The FCC noted that it had reviewed the acquisition under §
7 of the Clayton Act. Id at 109. Had the Commission assumed a § 7 violation or believed
the merger to be one, however, it would have been required to serve a complaint upon GTE
and Telenet directing them to show cause why the merger should not be prohibited. See
Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 502 (1967). But see United
States v. FCC, No. 77-1249, slip op. at 30-33 (D.C. Cir. March 7, 1980) (en banc).
50. 70 F.C.C.2d at 2255. Telenet, as a resale carrier, owns no transmission lines. Id
51. The § 214 certification process is an adjudication within the ambit of § 5 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976). This section prescribes oral hearings
when mandated by the enabling act. Since the Communications Act of 1934 does not re-
quire oral hearings in § 214 authorization adjudications, however, none need be granted.
See 72 F.C.C.2d at 164-65 (and cases cited therein).
52. 72 F.C.C.2d 11l, modified, 72 F.C.C.2d 516, reconsideration denied, FCC 79-380
(released Dec. 4, 1979).
53. See note 51 supra.
54. These conditions were designed to accomplish four interrelated goals: (1) ensuring
that Telenet remained a strong and innovative competitor; (2) guaranteeing Telenet's integ-
rity; (3) ensuring that Telenet would continue to serve the public interest; and (4) ensuring
viable competition. 72 F.C.C.2d at 135. These conditions prohibited GTE from marketing
Telenet's services, participating in the latter's support, advertising, research, sales and man-
agement activity, giving the latter proprietary information not available to other carriers,
and giving Telenet resale lines on more favorable terms than GTE extends them to other
carriers. Id at 135-49.
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arms-length parent/subsidiary relationship upon the merged firms. 55 In
setting these conditions, the FCC sought to balance Telenet's interest in
enjoying the economic benefits of a parent/subsidiary relationship with
the FCC's desire to shield GTE's monopoly service ratepayers and
Telenet's competitors from interservice cross-subsidies and other competi-
tive abuses.
5 6
GTE responded to this order by assailing the conditions as stringent,
ambiguous, and against the public interest. 57 In response, the FCC invited
interested parties to file comments and scheduled an oral presentation
before the Commission. After considering additional testimony, the FCC
modified the conditions to permit a closer operational relationship be-
tween Telenet and GTE. 8 In its second Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, however, the Commission emphasized its commitment to competition
in telecommunications and resolved that the conditions imposing an arms-
length separated parent/subsidiary relationship upon Telenet and GTE
were necessary to ensure workable competition in Telenet's chief market
- augmented data communication services. 59 Moreover, the FCC as-
serted that the conditions imposed upon the merger reflected the agency's
duty to enforce section 7 of the Clayton Act. 6' Thus, by applying section
55. Id at 195 (Fogarty, Comm'r, concurring).
56. Id at 135-36. The FCC termed the effect of these conditions upon the interactions
of the merged firms as "maximum separation." As the FCC has noted, the form of "maxi-
mum separation" differs with each application, but the essential ingredient has always been
the requirement that the existing carrier form a separate subsidiary to provide the new tele-
communications service. Id at 132. For an example of the application of "maximum sepa-
ration," see note 14 supra.
57. 72 F.C.C.2d at 516.
58. Id at 519-29. The relaxation of the conditions was premised upon GTE's represen-
tation that it would expeditiously develop an accounting system capable of disaggregating
and attributing the costs shared between GTE and Telenet. Id at 529. Additionally, the
FCC modified some of the conditions because it found such modifications could produce
lower service costs by allowing the firms to interact more closely without significantly in-
creasing the danger of interservice cross-subsidization. Id at 526. The modified conditions
provided that the firms might share office space and personnel, exchange non-customer pro-
prietary information, and engage in some joint research and development. Aside from these
changes, the conditions remained substantially identical. Thus, the FCC upheld its imposi-
tion of "maximum separation" upon the firms, albeit'in an attenuated form. See note 56
supra and note 59 and accompanying text infra.
59. 72 F.C.C.2d at 518. Three of the seven Commissioners concurred with the majority,
noting that when the FCC had imposed separate subsidiary requirements upon carriers in
the past, it had failed to analyze the impact of such organizational forms upon service costs.
Id at 532 (Fogarty, Comm'r, concurring). Additionally, the concurring Commissioners
warned that the agency's emphasis on curbing cross-subsidization and fostering competition
in telecommunications might be at cross purposes to the public interest-promoting telecom-
munications consumer welfare. Id
60. See note 49 supra.
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214 to a putative defacto line acquisition, the FCC effectively conducted a
premerger review, thereby imposing substantial conditions upon the
merger designed to thwart interservice cross-subsidization.
I GTE-TELENET MERGER - EXTENDING THE LIMITS OF
SECTION 214 IN A SALUTARY WAY
A. De Facto Line Acquisitions by De Facto Carriers
The FCC's action under section 214 in GTE-Telenet Merger reflects the
Commission's use of old tools in new ways to meet the challenge of regu-
lating an industry that has experienced unforeseen technological progress.
When the Communications Act of 1934 was enacted, there were only two
forms of effective telephonic communication - telephone and telegraph.6'
The Act was drafted to enable the FCC to regulate the provision of these
carrier services in monopoly markets;6" high entry barriers inherent in the
art of telecommunications in the 1930's made competition infeasible.63
Since the anticompetitive harms mergers may create are generally less sig-
nificant in markets where monopoly is encouraged and regulated,64 it is
not surprising that the Act lacks provisions designed to prohibit mergers.
In fact, the Act actually encourages carrier mergers. For example, under
section 221, merging telephone companies may seek the FCC's approval to
immunize their merger from the operation of the antitrust laws.6 5 Consis-
tent with the Act's monopoly orientation, section 221 powers may be in-
voked only by the merging telephone companies; the FCC is not
empowered to thwart the merger.66 Similarly, section 222, enacted in
1943, grants the FCC power to approve telegraph company mergers.67
Unlike section 221, however, it must be invoked by merging telegraph
61. See note 4 supra.
62. REPORT ON COMMUNICATION COMPANIES, H.R. REP. No. 1273, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934).
63. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
64. The chief economic problems mergers create are a result of the monopoly power
they engender. But, to the extent merging firms are regulated, their consolidation will gener-
ally be innocuous. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 85 (1944) (strict
regulation and supervision, particularly rate regulation, is an effective deterrent to the evils
of monopoly). But see 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 287-89 (1971).
65. 47 U.S.C. § 221 (1976). For a discussion of§ 221, see M. IRWIN, THE TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS INDUSTRY: INTEGRATION VS. COMPETITION 171 (1971) [hereinafter cited as M.
IRWIN]. See also 78 CONG. REC. 10314 (1934); 4 B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULA-
TION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2442 (1973).
66. See 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1976). See also M. IRWIN, supra note 65, at 171.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1976). Section 222 was enacted in 1943 to permit Postal Telegraph-
Cable Company and Western Union Company to merge with immunity from the antitrust
laws. Customer Interconnection, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 778 (1976). The section's enactment was
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companies and permits the FCC to halt such mergers.68 Although on its
face section 222 seems to favor competition, its legislative history indicates
otherwise. Section 222 was enacted to save one of the nation's two tele-
graph companies from impending insolvency by allowing the carriers to
merge without violating the antitrust laws. 69 Thus, like section 221, section
222 was aimed at encouraging rather than prohibiting mergers.
70
Progress in microwave radio transmission has fostered competition in
telecommunications 7' and has induced the FCC to open many communi-
cation markets to competition.72 Although the Act was not intended to
regulate competitive markets, the breadth of its provisions has made it a
useful regulatory tool in this regard.73 For example, the sections of the Act
pertaining to the regulation of broadcast systems have assisted the Com-
mission in regulating competition among microwave carriers. Because
carriers utilizing microwave radio techniques are radio licensees under sec-
tion 309 of the Act,74 changes of ownership among them are cognizable by
the FCC under section 3 10. 7  Since most common carriers hold radio
licenses for microwave transmission, the FCC is able to direct or prohibit
precipitated by Congress' fear that Postal Telegraph-Cable Company was gravely close to
insolvency. Id. See also 89 CONG. REC. 350 (1943).
68. M. IRWIN, supra note 65, at 172. Paragraph b(l) provides that domestic and inter-
national telegraph companies may not merge. 47 U.S.C. § 222(b)(I) (1976).
69. See note 67 supra.
70. See 89 CONG. REC. 348-54 (1943). A large portion of § 222 is dedicated to provi-
sions designed to curb the unemployment that would result from such mergers. See 47
U.S.C. § 222(f) (1976).
71. See Customer Interconnection, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 779-80 (1976). Seealso Washing-
ton Utils. & Trans. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1156 n.21 (9th Cir. 1975). Microwave
transmission technology began to grow during World War II. Its development was hastened
by the United States Army's need for a communication system in North Africa that the Axis
forces could not easily destroy or monitor. Because microwave radio transmits a narrow
signal that may be carried by antenna towers located up to 35 miles apart, it was ideally
suited to the military's needs. 61 F.C.C.2d at 779.
72. See, e.g., Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971) (FCC
adopts policy of open entry into the domestic private line market); Domestic Communica-
tions-Satellite Facilities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972) (FCC considers authorizing GTE to operate
a communication satellite carrying interstate telephone traffic in competition with American
Telephone and Telegraph Company); Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs., 62
F.C.C.2d 588 (1977) (Commission adopts policy in favor of resale and sharing of telecom-
munication services and open entry into the resale market).
73. Although the Act does not mention private line carriers, resale carriers, or data
communication carriers, these and other hybrid service carriers are regulated under title II
of the Act. See cases cited in note 72 supra.
74. See 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1976). See also 29 F.C.C.2d at 900-01.
75. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1976). See also General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 8 F.C.C.2d
183 (1967).
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most carrier mergers using section 310.76 Arguably, section 310 was not
intended to control carrier mergers since its drafters hardly could have
foreseen in 1934 the widespread use of radio waves for private message
transmission. Moreover, the legislative history of section 310 indicates that
its purposes were to control broadcast frequency ownership by aliens and
to prevent hidden holding companies from controlling the broadcast
licenses of their subsidiaries.77 Yet, although the Act is obsolete, the FCC
has been successful in coping with such unforeseen developments through
expansive interpretation.78
In GTE-Telenet Merger, the FCC was faced with an impending resale
carrier 79 acquisition by a holding company owning the nation's second
largest telephone system. The Commission sought control over the
merger, fearing the acquisition would create the potential for anticompeti-
tive conduct, but control was not available under section 310. Telenet, as a
resale carrier, was not licensed as a radio frequency operator under section
309.80 However, because Telenet's transmission line leases were subject to
Commission authority under section 214, the FCC considered section 214
review a condition precedent to the merger's consummation.
Although the Commission's power to control the acquisition of trans-
mission lines under section 214 has long been clear, section 214 had never
before been used to condition the acquisition of a carrier. Because the
Commission had in dictum disclaimed any power to control such acquisi-
tions under section 214,81 its interpretation of this section as conferring
such power is a significant shift in Commission policy.
The principal justification advanced by the FCC for applying section
214 to the GTE-Telenet merger is that the acquisition would result in
GTE's control over Telenet's carrier operations. Although the form of the
merger allowed Telenet to function as a GTE subsidiary with separate op-
erations,82 the Commission characterized the merger's form as a mere
76. Almost all of the non-telephone carriers in existence in 1975 used microwave radio
carrier techniques. See Customer Interconnection, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 799-806 (1976).
77. 4 B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2431,
2452 (1973).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-78 (1968)
(although the regulation of cable television was not within the contemplation of Congress
when it enacted the Act, the FCC's authority under the Act is broad enough to permit the
agency to regulate cable television). For a discussion of the impact of § 310 on carrier merg-
ers, see 72 F.C.C.2d at 105-06.
79. For a definition of resale carrier, see note 46 supra.
80. See Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs., 60"F.C.C.2d 261, 265, 316
(1976).
81. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
82. 72 F.C.C.2d at 114. See also 70 F.C.C.2d at 2255 (Fogarty, Comm'r, dissenting).
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corporate fiction having no regulatory significance.83 Thus, the FCC re-
garded the merger as a defacto transmission line acquisition subject to
section 214.84 A necessary premise in this interpretation is that GTE is in
fact a carrier because section 214 governs only extensions and deletions of
lines by carriers.85 The FCC again pierced the corporate veil to find GTE,
a holding company, to be a defacto carrier.86 The Commission reasoned
that GTE's control of the second largest telephone system in the nation
and of the Comstar communication satellite rendered it a carrier for regu-
latory purposes.87
Although the Commission's unwillingness to exalt form over substance
reflects commendable regulatory initiative, its application of section 214 to
the merger is inconsistent with the section's language and legislative his-
tory. Further, the Commission's disregard for corporate formalities is un-
supported by the Act.
Section 214 was enacted as an integral part of the monopoly regulatory
scheme for carriers. Patterned after section 1 of the Interstate Commerce
Act, 88 it seeks to prevent the unnecessary duplication of transmission facil-
ities and to prevent line deletions in geographic areas needing service.89
Unlike section 310, section 214 does not affect transfers of control among
entities holding transmission authorizations.9 ° Moreover, section 214 does
not apply to changes in the operation of lines unless the changes affect the
adequacy or the quality of service.9 '
The plain language of section 214 and its congressionally announced
purposes92 have guided courts interpreting the reach of that section. In
United Telegraph,93 a federal court reversed an FCC determination that
section 214 applies to an experimental service. Even though the service
83. 70 F.C.C.2d at 2250-51.
84. Id.
85. See notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra. Because Telenet would continue to
hold its transmission line authorizations, it would not be deleting transmission lines by
merging.
86. 70 F.C.C.2d at 2250-51.
87. Id
88. 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)-(22) (1976). See 4 B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION
OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2500 (1973).
89. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
90. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1976). On the contrary, § 214 refers only to "lines," defined as
"any channel of communication established by the use of appropriate equipment."
91. Id.
92. For a discussion of the congressional purposes for § 214, see notes 25-26 and accom-
panying text supra.
93. 436 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For a discussion of United Telegraph, see notes 35-
36 and accompanying text supra.
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involved an extension of the carrier's lines, the court held that the pro-
posed service was too temporary to be regarded as a line extension subject
to section 214 review. Similarly, in MC194 a court found that the FCC's
use of section 214 to limit a carrier's use of its authorized lines exceeded
the plain language and the purposes of section 214. Although a new use of
lines by a carrier may constitute entry into a new communication field, the
MCI court was not persuaded that new authorizations were required by
section 214.95 If a carrier may offer new services over previously author-
ized lines without FCC approval under section 214, it is difficult to under-
stand why an acquisition of a carrier by a holding company should be
subject to section 214 review. The latter situation involves substantially
less change in the carrier's services than the former.
General Telephone and Electronics Corp. 96 casts the propriety of the
FCC's section 214 invocation in GTE-Telenet Merger into further doubt.
In the former case, GTE had applied for FCC authority under section 310
of the Act to acquire Hawaiian Telephone Company (HTC). Although
HTC operated section 214 authorized lines, the Commission did not re-
quire section 214 authorization for the companies to merge. Relying upon
the plain language of section 214, the FCC found that the section was not
applicable to the merger because it would "not result in any change in the
HTC facilities or service, or in any way change the relationship of HTC to
the Commission."97
Interestingly, the GTE-Telenet merger closely parallels the acquisition
of HTC by GTE. The two mergers differ only in the applicability of sec-
tion 310 and the type of carrier being acquired. Since section 214 does not
differentiate among carrier types, the two mergers were identical for sec-
tion 214 purposes. It is therefore difficult to justify the Commission's ap-
plication of section 214 to one merger but not to the other.
Like the defacto line acquisition doctrine of GTE-Telenet Merger, the
FCC's attribution of defacto carrier status to GTE is inconsistent with
previous Commission practice and with provisions of the Act. Histori-
cally, the FCC has respected corporate formalities in section 214 proceed-
ings. For example, in Nebraska Telephone98 the Commission applied
section 214 to the transfer of telephone lines from a telephone company to
its subsidiary. The FCC rejected the petitioner's argument that the parent
94. 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1977). See notes 37-42 and
accompanying text supra for a discussion of MCI.
95. 561 F.2d at 380.
96. 8 F.C.C.2d 183 (1967).
97. Id. at 189.
98. 5 F.C.C. 132 (1938). See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
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and subsidiary were the same entity under the Act's regulatory scheme.
Had the FCC interpreted the parent/subsidiary relationship of the trans-
ferring companies in Nebraska Telephone as it did in GTE-Telenet Merger,
section 214 would not have been applied to the former case. Conversely,
had the respect given corporate formality in Nebraska Telephone guided
the FCC in GTE-Telenet Merger, section 214 would not have been applied
to GTE's acquisition of Telenet. The preferability of the Nebraska Tele-
phone approach is supported by a comparison of section 214 with sections
218 and 219 of the Act. Sections 218 and 219 empower the FCC to de-
mand operational and financial reports from carriers and all entities that
are controlled by or that control carriers. 99 In contrast, section 214 ad-
dresses only carriers. It appears that if Congress had intended the term
"carrier" in section 214 to include the owners of carriers, it would have
expressed this intention. By disregarding corporate relationships, the FCC
may be performing what it considers to be its regulatory duty, although the
Act seems to dictate a different perspective. Again, General Telephone and
Electronics Corporation conflicts with GTE- Telenet Merger. In the former
case, the FCC characterized GTE as a holding company and refused to
find that the merger resulted in GTE's acquisition of HTC's lines. Nota-
bly, the Commission did not explain its departure from General Telephone
and Electronics Corporation reasoning in GTE- Telenet Merger.
Although GTE, as a holding company, will exert some control over
Telenet, such control does not make GTE a carrier. Telenet retains princi-
pal control over its day-to-day operations and is the carrier of its services.
Furthermore, as a part of the GTE corporate family, Telenet's respon-
sibilites under the Act are not changed. Any attempt it makes to acquire
or delete transmission lines will still be subject to prior section 214 authori-
zation. Although GTE may now be able to order Telenet to initiate service
changes which Telenet might not have proposed as an unaffiliated carrier,
section 214 is blind to the source of ideas behind line changes. Section 214
requires only that proposed line additions and deletions serve the public
convenience and necessity. In this light, GTE's control of Telenet is, at
most, of incidental significance under section 214.
Notwithstanding the Commission's broad construction of section 214 in
GTE-Telenet Merger, the FCC's use of section 214 closed a loophole that
otherwise might have permitted a potentially anticompetitive merger to es-
cape the Act's coverage. Although the FCC's action may not be in strict
conformity with the Act, it is consistent with the Act's overall goal - pro-
99. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 218, 219 (1976).
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moting the welfare of the telecommunications consumer. " The condi-
tions imposed on the merger by the FCC under section 214 should prevent
substantially the merged firms from commingling service costs - a major
source of cross-subsidization.'' Still, Telenet will benefit from its rela-
tionship with GTE, a firm with considerable experience in telecommunica-
tions and with great financial power.
B. Section 214 as a Quasi-Clayton Act Enforcement Tool
The FCC has always possessed the power to invoke section 7 of the
Clayton Act against anticompetitive carrier mergers. Yet, in its thirty-six
year history, the Commission has never used its Clayton Act powers.10 2 In
GTE-Telenet Merger, the FCC expressed concern that the merger of GTE
and Telenet might be in violation of the Clayton Act.'0 3 However, the
Commission found the congressionally intended scheme for enforcement
of the Clayton Act, set out in section 11, to be inadequate."° Instead, the
Commission analyzed the merger using section 7 criteria as part of its sec-
tion 214 review. This analysis revealed that the merger did not violate the
Clayton Act.'0 5 Thus, in one proceeding the Commission was able to ful-
fill simultaneously its responsibilities under section 214 of the Communi-
cations Act and under section 7 of the Clayton Act. Moreover, by
conducting a section 7 analysis of the merger in a section 214 proceeding,
the FCC was able to employ powers similar to the premerger notification
and enforcement powers under the Clayton Act possessed only by the FTC
and the DOJ.
0 6
100. This goal was reiterated by Commissioner Fogarty in GTE-Telenet Merger, 72
F.C.C.2d at 532 (Fogarty, Comm'r, concurring).
101. See note 7 supra.
102. See H.R. REP. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1814. See also International Tel. & Tel. Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs.
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1181 (D. Hawaii 1972), rev'd in part, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
103. 70 F.C.C.2d at 2249-50.
104. 72 F.C.C.2d at 108-10.
105. Id at 149-59. See note 115 infra.
106. The FTC, under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976), and the DOJ, under 15 U.S.C. § 25
(1976), are the only federal agencies with statutory power to seek preliminary injunctions
against the consummation of mergers that will violate § 7. Prior to 1973, when 15 U.S.C. §
53(b) was amended, the FTC did not have statutory authority to halt the consummation of
mergers. However, the United States Supreme Court had found that, in limited circum-
stances, the FTC could exercise such power under § 41(a) of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651 (1976). FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966). Section 7(a) of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976), was enacted by Congress in
1976 to supplement the premerger § 7 enforcement powers of the DOJ and FTC by requir-
ing participants in major proposed mergers to notify these agencies prior to merger. Under
this Act, either agency can delay the merger's consummation for up to 50 days after it re-
ceives sufficient notice of the merger plan. During this time, the two agencies may investi-
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The FCC's use of section 214 in GTE-Telenet Merger serves to highlight
and cure some of the deficiencies inherent in agency enforcement of
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Primary among its faults, section 11 of the
Clayton Act only empowers agencies to enforce the Clayton Act when they
have "reason to believe that any . . [carrier] . . .is violating or has vio-
lated"' °7 the Clayton Act. It does not authorize agencies to proceed
against proposed mergers that will violate the Clayton Act when consum-
mated.O8 Since it is frequently impossible once firms are merged to elimi-
nate all the anticompetitive consequences of the merger by ordering
divestiture, premerger prohibitive injunction power is crucial to effective
Clayton Act enforcement.' 0 9
Congress, having determined that lack of premerger enforcement ren-
dered section 11 too weak, amended the Federal Trade Commission Act in
1973 to grant the FTC premerger Clayton Act enforcement authority.' "'
However, Congress has not extended such power to the other regulatory
agencies with Clayton Act authority."' Thus, there is a fragmentation of
Clayton Act enforcement authority. With regard to common carrier merg-
ers, for example, the FTC possesses premerger enforcement power while
the FCC possesses postmerger authority." 2 Because agencies with Clay-
gate the proposed merger and seek a preliminary injunction against its consummation. For
an exhaustive elaboration on the purposes and operation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act, see H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. i, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2637-48. See also Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976: An Anaysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I (1977).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
108. Id. See also FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 613-20 (1966) (Fortas, J., dis-
senting).
109. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. After a study of 39 merger cases, one
commentator concluded that successful relief from existing § 7 violations was only achieved
in six of these cases. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law. Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Pyrrhic Victories].
110. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976). The legislative history of this section is set out in [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2533.
111. While the legislative history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
is silent on the question of why premerger notification and enforcement authority was not
extended to those regulatory agencies having Clayton Act enforcement power under § 11,
the answer may lie in the allocation of congressional authority. The House and Senate Judi-
ciary Committees exercise jurisdiction over the federal antitrust laws, CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, INC., WASHINGTON INFORMATION DIRECTORY 1975-76, at 420 (1975), but lack
authority over the federal regulatory agencies; authority over the latter is held by the Senate
and House Commerce Committees. Id at 1419. Thus, an effort to arm the regulatory agen-
cies with premerger notification and enforcement power would have entailed placing the bill
before the latter committees with the attendant risk that they might veto or emasculate the
bill.
112. See notes 106-08 and accompanying text supra. See also Fruit Growers Express,
Inc. v. FTC, 274 F. 205, 207 (7th Cir. 1921), appeal dismissed, 251 U.S. 629 (1923).
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ton Act enforcement authority have a duty, unmitigated by prosecutorial
discretion, to enforce the Act," 3 this bifurcation of authority is especially
troublesome. It seems more logical, for example, for the FCC to be able to
prevent or condition mergers while still proposed, rather than to disap-
prove or alter radically mergers after their consummation, thereby causing
havoc to the firms, their customers and their creditors. 4
The FCC circumvented this limitation in its Clayton Act authority by
conducting a section 7 analysis of the GTE-Telenet merger before its con-
summation as part of its section 214 review. Although the Commission
found the merger legal under the Clayton Act," 5 it would have been in an
excellent position to institute prompt Clayton Act enforcement proceed-
ings as soon as the merger was consummated if it had found the merger
unlawful. The section 214 review, however, only provided the FCC with a
vehicle for studying the merger's lawfullness under the Clayton Act; it did
not afford the Commission the opportunity to invoke the Clayton Act to
enjoin or condition the merger. Nonetheless, the FCC used its section 214
review process to achieve similar results but without shouldering the high
burden of proof necessary to enjoin unconsummated mergers under sec-
tion 7."' 16 Moreover, the FCC was able to consider the merger in light of
the objectives of both the Clayton Act and the Communications Act,
whereas a Clayton Act proceeding is designed only to address Clayton Act
issues." 7 For example, to receive Clayton Act approval a proposed
merger need only have less than a reasonable probability of substantially
lessening competition and no tendency to create a monopoly, while section
214 requires a proposed merger to satisfy a broad public convenience and
necessity standard. Additionally, section 214 does not contain a number of
the time-consuming procedures found in the Clayton Act. For example,
section 214 permits the FCC to review a proposed merger without first
holding an oral hearing." 8 The Clayton Act, on the other hand, requires
the reviewing agency to serve a complaint on the putative violator, to per-
mit the Attorney General to intervene, and to conduct an oral hearing on
113. See Denver, supra note 49, at 502.
114. These possible ramifications are a few of many that render the divestiture remedy to
§ 7 violations bittersweet. See Pyrrhic Victories, supra note 109, at 53-74.
115. The FCC analyzed the merger under § 7 and found that, as conditioned, the acqui-
sition would not be in violation of the Clayton Act. 72 F.C.C.2d at 149-59.
116. See note 134 infra.
117. Section 11 of the Clayton Act grants named federal agencies the authority to en-
force §§ 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act and provides the only mechanism through which
these agencies can enforce those sections of the Clayton Act. It does not address separate
administrative issues. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
118. See 72 F.C.C.2d at 164-66 (and cases cited therein).
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the issues presented." 9 Finally, premerger review under section 214 is not
encumbered by the strict time limitations mandated by a premerger Clay-
ton Act review. 12' Thus, while the FCC's Clayton Act authority and sec-
tion 214 of the Communications Act are quite different, in GTE-Telenet
Merger the FCC effectively used section 214 to conduct a premerger re-
view similar to that conducted under the Clayton Act, but without the pro-
cedural and substantive limitations of the Clayton Act.
12 1
C Legislative Initiatives in the Wake of GTE-Telenet Merger
If the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit disapproves of the FCC's use of section 214 jurisdiction in its review
of GTE-Telenet Merger, a gap will exist in the Commission's ability to
prevent anticompetitive practices. The FCC will lack statutory authority
to guide carrier mergers not resulting in the transfer of transmission -lines
or in the shift of control over radio licenses. Although large carrier merg-
ers will still be subject to FTC and DOJ review under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act,' 22 a legislative extension to the FCC of Clayton Act pre-
merger notification and enforcement authority might distribute more ra-
tionally antimerger law enforcement responsibilities. 23  The FCC's
continuous economic regulation of the carrier industry enables it to under-
stand the nature and the impact of forces at work in an industry with ex-
tremely intricate technical and financial relationships.124 This knowledge
has been supplemented by the Commission's exhaustive investigations into
anticompetitive carrier practices. 12 Moreover, once a merger is complete,
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1976).
120. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976) with note 106 supra.
121. See 72 F.C.C.2d at 164-66.
122. The DOJ conducted a premerger review of the proposed GTE-Telenet merger and
did not take any action to prevent it. 72 F.C.C.2d at 163.
123. J. Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries 82 (1977)
(unpublished thesis in Georgetown University Law Center Library) (flexibility and scope of
fact-finding apparatus make agencies suited to decide certain factual matters); Far East Con-
ference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 575 (1952) (limited function of judicial review is
better used by preliminary resort to agencies); accord, 6 H. TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAWS 169
(1974); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 886 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (§ 7 analysis problems are largely factual, their solutions depending upon intimate
agency familiarity with particular features of industries). But see J. Shuman, supra at 92
(agency expertise is limited to administrative questions and should not impinge on courts'
antitrust jurisdiction).
124. Hearings on S. 611 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) (statement of
Charles Jones on behalf of American Telephone and Telegraph Company).
125. For a survey of the investigations the FCC has conducted to study anticompetitive
carrier practices, see Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Customer
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the FCC may be reluctant to institute section 7 proceedings because of the
impact of divestiture on employment and the functioning of the firms.
126
There are, however, countervailing considerations that may militate
against extending premerger Clayton Act power to the FCC. Granting
premerger notification and enforcement authority to the Commission
would subject prospective mergees to the scrutiny of yet another agency.
127
This burden might be aggravated by the conflicting interpretations of the
Clayton Act that are apt to emerge. I28  While this might minimize the
likelihood of anticompetitive mergers, it might also inhibit potentially le-
gal and beneficial mergers. 29  The history of section 7's construction
reveals its capacity to be read to achieve results that fall short of fostering
competition.1 30 Furthermore, it is uncertain whether Clayton Act pre-
merger notification and enforcement jurisdiction would materially aid the
FCC in its regulatory efforts. Thus far, with the exception of its use in
GTE-Telenet Merger, the FCC has not exercised its Clayton Act author-
ity.'3 ' While the trend toward deregulation may encourage the FCC to
use its Clayton Act powers, 132 changes in carrier technologies may create
Interconnection, 61 F.C.C.2d 766 (1976); AT&T (Docket 18128), 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976);
Casenote, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 152 (1977).
126. See notes 22 & 109 supra. Normally, the relief of divestiture is necessary to extir-
pate the harm of a § 7 violation. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S.
316, 328-31(1961).
127. Businesses are generally displeased at being subject to the Clayton Act enforcement
authority of both the FTC and the DOJ. See Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Anitrust Laws
by the Department of Justice and the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAW. 2075, 2077
(1976). The FTC and the DOJ have reduced the premerger notification burden on corpora-
tions by assigning premerger investigation responsibilities between the two agencies through
a liaison procedure. Id at 2079. See also Schenefield, The Disclosure of Antitrust Viola-
tions and Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 FED. B. J. 76, 80 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure
and Discretion].
128. Since an agency conducting premerger § 7 review is largely speculating as to the
future effects a merger might have, differences of interpretation can be great. See L.
SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 259 (1977). See
also note 17 and accompanying text supra.
129. This understanding has led the DOJ to exercise its Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act premerger notification powers with moderation. It realizes that a request
for additional information on a proposed merger may easily lead to the abandonment of
merger plans. Disclosure and Discretion, supra note 127, at 80. See also L. SCHWARTZ & J.
FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 164 (1977).
130. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
131. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
132. Deregulation is the movement to replace regulation of firms with competition
between firms. To the extent that deregulation substitutes competition for regulation, there
should, theoretically, be a reduction in the conffict between regulatory schemes and § 7 of
the Clayton Act. See Fulda, Antitrust Considerations in Motor Carrier Mergers, 56 MICH.
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economies of scale that will increase the maximum efficient size of carri-
ers, 133 thereby further reducing the Commission's incentive to enforce sec-
tion 7. Moreover, since proposed mergers are inherently unstable,
unrestrained use of premerger notification power may frustrate many
otherwise beneficial merger plans.' 34 Finally, since mergers that may be
lawful under the Clayton Act may not be consistent with the policies of the
Communications Act, the FCC would probably prefer to review carrier
mergers under the standards of its own Act. Although those factors do not
collectively support the conclusion that Clayton Act premerger notification
and enforcement power would not be benefical to the FCC, they do sug-
gest that the FCC might exercise merger control power more effectively
under another scheme.
An alternative to extending premerger Clayton Act enforcement author-
ity to the FCC would be to amend section 214 to embrace all carrier merg-
ers. The FCC's broad power under section 214's public convenience and
necessity standard, and its authority to place protective conditions upon its
approval of section 214 applications would allow the Commission to struc-
ture carrier mergers so as to avoid their anticompetitive effects. This
power would far exceed premerger notification and enforcement power
under the Clayton Act by allowing the FCC to reach mergers that would
be legal under the narrower Clayton Act standard. Moreover, it would
permit the Commission to adapt to the changing exigencies of carrier regu-
lation and to promote goals other than competition where appropriate.'35
L. REV. 1237, 1288 (1958). For a discussion on the possibilities and implications of federal
deregulation, see Colloquium, The Deregulation of Industry, 51 IND. L.J. 682 (1976).
133. Economies of scale are characterized by decreasing costs per unit of output as pro-
duction is increased. See C. COLE, MICROECONOMIcS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 183
(1973). See also 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITU-
TIONS 116-26 (1970). In some industries, the economies of scale are so large that it is most
efficient for a few firms to supply the entire market of the industry. See L. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST § 117 (1976).
134. See note 129 supra. There are some substantive limitations on the award of pre-
liminary relief that render premerger injunction jurisdiction relatively impotent. Agencies
seeking such relief against threatened Clayton Act violations are handicapped not only by
the high burden of proof required for such equitable relief but also by courts' reluctance to
grant preliminary injunctions when the standard of proof the agency will have to meet at
trial is a question of probability. L. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST & REGULATORY
ALTERNATIVES 259 (1977). See also Schneiderman, Preliminary Relief in Clayton Act Sec-
tion 7 Cases, 42 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 587 (1973); Note, "Preliminary Preliminary" Relief
Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 82 YALE L.J. 155 (1972). The DOJ has sought to limit
premerger investigation to a procedural role because of its capacity to frustrate unduly
merger plans. Disclosure and Discretion, supra note 127, at 80.
135. Section 214 adjudications are guided by the broad and flexible public convenience
and necessity standard. See note II supra. This standard gives the FCC great discretion in
the exercise of its authority. Compare FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91
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This alternative gives the FCC power within its traditional expertise,
whereas extending the Commission's Clayton Act authority may give it
antitrust responsibilities that it is ill-equipped to discharge.' 36  Such an
extension of section 214 is consistent with the thrust of legislation recently
introduced in Congress 37 and serves to bring the Communications Act of
1934 more in line with the Commission's current regulatory needs.
III. CONCLUSION
Anticompetitive practices remain a persistent common carrier regulation
problem. Although the FCC has taken steps to solve this problem, the
practice continues. The Commission's novel use of section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934 to conduct a premerger review of the acqui-
sition of a competitive carrier by a holding company in GTE-Telenet
Merger is an example of the Commission's expansive application of the
Communications Act of 1934 to meet the regulatory challenges of telecom-
munications in the 1980's.
While the FCC's use of section 214 in GTE-Telenet Merger enhances the
Commission's ability to foster competition in telecommunications, judicial
review of the Commission's action may determine that the FCC has ex-
ceeded its section 214 authority. In this instance, Congress should consider
the merits of extending the FCC's authority under section 214 to encom-
pass premerger review.
Thomas J Dougherty, Jr.
(1953) (the court's role is limited to saying whether the FCC has exercised fairly its discre-
tion in applying the public interest standard) and General Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d
390, 401 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969) (FCC's interpretation of its Act is
subject to great judicial deference), with Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States,
240 F. Supp. 867, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (the standards of legality under the Clayton Act must
ultimately be determined by the United States Supreme Court). The primary and guiding
standard of the Clayton Act, on the other hand, is competition. See Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951). See also Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block &
Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1959).
136. See Shuman, supra note 123, at 92.
137. See S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(b) (1979); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §
331 (1979); S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 225(d)(2)(C) (1979).
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